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A STRICT NON-STANDARD INEQUALITY .999 . . . < 1
KARIN USADI KATZ AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ∗
Abstract. Is .999 . . . equal to 1? A. Lightstone’s decimal expan-
sions yield an infinity of numbers in [0, 1] whose expansion starts
with an unbounded number of repeated digits “9”. We present
some non-standard thoughts on the ambiguity of the ellipsis, mod-
eling the cognitive concept of generic limit of B. Cornu and D. Tall.
A choice of a non-standard hyperinteger H specifies an H-infinite
extended decimal string of 9s, corresponding to an infinitesimally
diminished hyperreal value (11.5). In our model, the student re-
sistance to the unital evaluation of .999 . . . is directed against an
unspoken and unacknowledged application of the standard part
function, namely the stripping away of a ghost of an infinitesimal,
to echo George Berkeley. So long as the number system has not
been specified, the students’ hunch that .999 . . . can fall infinites-
imally short of 1, can be justified in a mathematically rigorous
fashion.
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1. The problem of unital evaluation
Student resistance to the evaluation of .999 . . . as the real number 1
(henceforth referred to as the unital evaluation) has been widely dis-
cussed in the mathematics education literature. It has been suggested
that the source of such resistance lies in a psychological predisposition
in favor of thinking of .999 . . . as a process, or iterated procedure, rather
than the final outcome, see for instance D. Tall’s papers [28, p. 6], [25,
p. 221], [23] (see also [27] for another approach).
We propose an alternative model to explain such resistance, in the
framework of non-standard analysis. From this point of view, the resis-
tance is directed against an unspoken and unacknowledged application
of the standard part function “st” (see Section 11, item 11.3), namely
the stripping away of a ghost of an infinitesimal, to echo George Berke-
ley [3], implicit in unital evaluation:
st



 = 1.
Figure 1.1. Taking standard part of wikiartist’s con-
ception of an infinity of 9s
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What is the significance of such fine (indeed, infinitesimal) distric-
tions between .999 . . . and 1? As this text is addressed to a wide
audience, it may be worth recalling that dividing by the difference
1− .999 . . . will only be possible if the latter is nonzero, a matter of im-
mediate import for studying rates of change and calculating derivatives
(see Section 7).
The hyperreal approach to a certain extent vindicates the student
resistance to education professionals’ toeing the standard line on unital
evaluation: so long as the number system has not been specified, the
students’ hunch that .999 . . . can fall infinitesimally short of 1, can be
justified in a mathematically rigorous fashion.
In Section 2, based on a formula for a geometric sum, we summarize
the standard argument in favor of unital evaluation. In Section 3,
we summarize the standard resistance to the latter. In Section 4, we
construct a hyperreal decimal in [0, 1), represented by a string of H-
infinitely many repeated 9s, and identify its Lightstone representation.
In Section 5, we square the strict inequality with standard reality, by
means of the standard part function. In Section 6, we represent the
hyperreal graphically by means of an infinite-magnification microscope,
already exploited for pedagogical purposes by Keisler [15] and Tall [23].
In Section 7, we exploit the hyperreal to calculate f ′(1).
In Section 8, we develop an applied-mathematical model of a hy-
percalculator so as to explain a familiar phenomenon of a calculator
returning a string of 9s in place of an integer. In Section 9, we examine
the cognitive concept of generic limit of Cornu and Tall in mathematics
education, in relation to a hyperreal approach to limits. In Section 10,
we set the situation in perspective, with E. A. Abbott.
Section 11 is a technical appendix containing basic material on non-
standard calculus. The historical Section 12 contains an examination
of the views of Courant, Lakatos, and E. Bishop. Section 13 contains
a 10-step proposal concerning the problem of unital evaluation.
2. A geometric sum
Evaluating the formula
1 + r + r2 + . . .+ rn−1 =
1− rn
1− r
at r = 1
10
, we obtain
1 +
1
10
+
1
100
+ . . .+
1
10n−1
=
1− 1
10n
1− 1
10
,
or alternatively
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1.11 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
=
1− 1
10n
1− 1
10
.
Multiplying by 9
10
, we obtain
.999 . . . 9︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
=
9
10
(
1− 1
10n
1− 1
10
)
= 1− 1
10n
for every n ∈ N. As n increases without bound, the formula
.999 . . . 9︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
= 1− 1
10n
(2.1)
becomes
.999 . . . = 1.
Or does it?
3. Arguing by “I told you so”
When I tried this one on my teenage daughter, she remained uncon-
vinced. She felt that the number .999 . . . is smaller than 1. After all,
just look at it! There is something missing before you reach 1. I then
proceeded to give a number of arguments. Apologetic mumbo-jumbo
about the alleged “non-unicity of decimal representation” fell on deaf
ears. The one that seemed to work best was the following variety of
the old-fashioned “because I told you so” argument: factor out a 3:
3(.333 . . .) = 1
to obtain
.333 . . . =
1
3
(3.1)
and “everybody knows” that the number .333 . . . is exactly “a third” on
the nose. Q.E.D. This worked for a few minutes, but then the validity
of (3.1) was called into question, as well.
4. Coming clean
Then I finally broke down. In Abraham Robinson’s theory of hy-
perreal analysis [20], there is a notion of an infinite hyperinteger (see
Section 11, item 11.8). H. Jerome Keisler [15] took to denoting such
an entity by the symbol
H,
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possibly because its inverse is an infinitesimal h typically appearing in
the denominator of the familiar definition of derivative (it most decid-
edly does not stand for “Howard”). Taking infinitely many terms in
formula (2.1) is interpreted as replacing n ∈ N by an infinite hyperin-
teger
H ∈ N∗ \ N.
The transfer principle (see Section 11, item 11.1) applied to (2.1) then
yields
.999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
= 1− 1
10H
where the infinitesimal quantity 1
10H
is nonzero:
1
10H
> 0.
Therefore we obtain the strict nonstandard inequality
.999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
< 1 (4.1)
and my teenager was right all along. Note that hyperreal extended
decimal expansions were treated by A. Lightstone in [17, pp. 245–247].
In his notation, the hyperreal appearing in the left-hand-side of (4.1)
appears as the extended decimal
.999 . . . ; . . . 999ˆ
with the hat “ˆ” indicating the H-th decimal place, where the last
repeated digit 9 occurs. We have employed the underbrace notation as
in (4.1) rather than Lightstone’s semicolon, as it parallels the finite case
more closely, and seems more intuitive. An alternative construction of
a strict inequality .999 . . . < 1 may be found in [18], however in a
number system which is not a field.
5. Squaring .999 . . . < 1 with reality
To obtain a real number in place of the hyperreal .999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
, we apply
the standard part function “st” (see Section 11, item 11.3):
st
(
.999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
)
= st
(
1− 1
10H
)
= 1− st
(
1
10H
)
= 1.
To elaborate further, one could make the following remark. Even in
standard analysis, the expression .999 . . . is only shorthand for the
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limit of the finite expression (2.1) when the standard integer n in-
creases without bound. From the hyperreal viewpoint, “taking the
limit” is accomplished in two steps:
(1) evaluating the expression at an infinite hyperinteger H , and
then
(2) taking the standard part.
The two steps form the non-standard definition of limit (see Sec-
tion 11, item 11.10). Now the first step (evaluating at H) produces
a hyperreal number dependent on H (in all cases it will be strictly
less than 1). The second step will strip away the infinitesimal part
and produce the standard real number 1 in the cluster (see Section 11,
item 11.4) of points infinitely close to it.
Remark 5.1 (Multiple infinities). The existence of more than one infi-
nite hyperreal is not only a requirement to have a field, but is actually
extremely useful. For example, using the natural hypperreal exten-
sion f ∗ of f (see Section 11, item 11.1), it is possible to write down a
pointwise definition of uniform continuity of a function f (see below).
Such a definition considerably reduces the quantifier complexity of the
standard definition.
To elaborate, note that the standard definition of uniform continu-
ity of a real function f can be said to be global rather than local (i.e.
pointwise), in the sense that, unlike ordinary continuity, uniform con-
tinuity cannot be defined as a pointwise property of f . Meanwhile,
in the framework of Robinson’s theory, it is possible to give a defini-
tion of uniform continuity of the real function f in terms of its natural
hyperreal extension, denoted
f ∗,
in such a way that the definition is local, in the sense of depending
only on each pointwise cluster (see Section 11, item 11.4) in the domain
of f ∗. Thus, f is uniformly continuous on R if the following condition
is satisfied:
∀x ∈ R∗ (y ≈ x =⇒ f ∗(y) ≈ f ∗(x)) .
Here ≈ stands for the relation of being infinitely close. The condition
must be satisfied at the infinite hyperreals x, in addition to the fi-
nite ones. This addition is what distinguishes uniform continuity from
ordinary continuity.
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Figure 6.1. Three infinitely close hyperreals under a microscope
6. Hyperreals under magnifying glass
The symbol “∞” is employed in standard real analysis to define a
formal completion of the real line R, namely
R ∪ {∞} (6.1)
(sometimes a formal point “−∞” is added, as well).
Such a formal device is helpful in simplifying the statements of cer-
tain theorems (which would otherwise have a number of subcases). The
symbol is used in a different sense in topology and projective geometry,
where the Thom compactification R ∪ {∞} of R is a circle:
R ∪ {∞} ≈ S1. (6.2)
We have refrained from using the symbol “∞” to denote an infinite
hyperreal, as in
.999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
∞
,
even though the symbol “∞” does convey the idea of the infinite more
effectively than the symbol “H” that we have used. The reason is so as
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to avoid the risk of creating a false impression of the uniqueness of an
infinite point (as in (6.1) or (6.2) above), in the field R∗ (see Section 11,
item 11.2).
We represent the hyperreal
.999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
(6.3)
visually by means of an infinite-resolution microscope already exploited
for pedagogical purposes by Keisler [15]. The hyperreal .999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
ap-
pearing in the diagram of Figure 6.1 illustrates graphically the strict
hyperreal inequality
.999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
< 1,
where, as we already mentioned, the symbol H is exploited to denote
a fixed infinite Robinson hyperinteger (see Section 11, item 11.8).
7. Zooming in on slope of tangent line
To calculate the slope of the tangent line to the curve y = x2 at
x = 1, we first compute the ratio
∆y
∆x
=
(.9..)2 − 12
.9..− 1 =
(.9..− 1)(.9..+ 1)
.9..− 1 = .9.. + 1,
where we have deleted the underbrace ︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
and also shortened the
symbol .999 . . . to .9.., so as to lighten the notation.
Therefore the slope is
dy
dx
= st
(
∆y
∆x
)
= st(.9..+ 1) = st(.9..) + 1 = 1 + 1 = 2.
Note that
∆x = .9..− 1 = −.0..; ..01
in Lightstone’s notation, where the digit “1” appears in theHth-decimal
place, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
8. Hypercalculator returns .999 . . .
Everyone who has ever held an electronic calculator is familiar with
the curious phenomenon of it sometimes returning the value
.999999
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Figure 7.1. Zooming in on the slope of tangent line to
the curve y = x2 at x = 1
in place of the expected 1.000000. For instance, a calculator pro-
grammed to apply Newton’s method to find the zero of a function,
may return the .999999 value as the unique zero of the function
log x.
Developing a model to account for such a phenomenon is complicated
by the variety of the degree of precision displayed, as well as the greater
precision typically available internally than that displayed on the LCD.
To simplify matters, we will consider an idealized model, called a hy-
percalculator, of a theoretical calculator that applies Newton’s method
precisely H times, where H is a fixed infinite hyperinteger, as discussed
in the previous section.
Theorem 8.1. Let f be a concave increasing differentiable function
with domain an open interval (1 − ǫ, 1 + ǫ) and vanishing at its mid-
point. Then the hypercalculator applied to f will return a hyperreal dec-
imal .999 . . . with an initial segment consisting of an unbounded number
of repeated 9’s.
Proof. Assume for simplicity that f(x0) < 0. We have
x1 = x0 +
|f(x0)|
f ′(x0)
.
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By the mean value theorem, there is a point c such that x0 < c < 1
where f ′(c) = |f(x0)|
1−x0
, or
|f(x0)|
f ′(c)
= 1− x0.
Since f is concave, its derivative f ′ is decreasing, hence
x1 = x0 +
|f(x0)|
f ′(x0)
< x0 + 1− x0 = 1.
Thus x1 < 1. Inductively, the point xn+1 = xn +
|f(xn)|
f ′(xn)
satisfies xn < 1
for all n. By the transfer principle (see Section 11, item 11.1), the
hyperreal xH satisfies a strict inequality
xH < 1,
as well (cf. (4.1)). Hence the hypercalculator returns a value strictly
smaller than 1 yet infinitely close to 1, proving the theorem. 
9. Generic limit and precise meaning of infinity
The precise meaning of the finite expression
.999...9, n times
is that the repeated digit 9 occurs precisely n times. The standard
non-terminating decimal
.999 . . . ,
as it is traditionally written, is said to have an unbounded number of
repeated digits 9, but the expression “infinitely many 9’s” is only a
figure of speech, as “infinity” is not a number in standard analysis, in
the sense that, whenever a precise meaning is attributed to the phrase
“infinitely many 9’s”, it is almost invariably in terms of limits. D. Tall
writes in [26] as follows:
[...] the infinite decimal 0.999 . . . is intended to signal
the limit of the sequence 0.9, 0.99, 0.999, ... which is 1,
but in practice it is ofter imagined as a limiting process
which never quite reaches 1.
Tall [24, 26] describes a concept in cognitive theory he calls a generic
limit concept in the following terms:
[...] if a quantity repeatedly gets smaller and smaller
and smaller without ever being zero, then the limiting
object is naturally conceptualised as an extremely small
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quantity that is not zero (Cornu [7]). Infinitesimal quan-
tities are natural products of the human imagination de-
rived through combining potentially infinite repetition
and the recognition of its repeating properties.
(see [11] for the related notion of procept). A technical realisation of the
cognitive concept of generic limit is achieved in the hyperreal line (see
Section 11, item 11.2) as follows. Given an infinite hyperinteger H , con-
sider the hyperreal repeated decimal where the repeated digit 9 occurs
precisely H times, in the sense routinely used in non-standard calcu-
lus, for example, when one partitions a compact interval into H parts
in the proof of the extreme value theorem (see Section 11, item 11.9).
Such a number can be denoted suggestively by .999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
with an under-
brace indicating that the digit 9 occurs H times, resulting in a strict
inequality .999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
< 1 (with the underbrace indicating that we are not
referring to the standard real). In Lightstone’s notation, this hyperreal
would be expressed by the hyperdecimal
.999...; ...9,
the last digit 9 occurring in theH-th position. Such a hyperreal appears
to be the mathematical counterpart of the cognitive concept of generic
limit.
10. Limits, generic limits, and Flatland
As far as standard limits are concerned, given the sequence u1 = .9,
u2 = .99, u3 = .999, etc., from the hyperreal viewpoint we have
lim
n→∞
un = st(uH),
where “st” is the standard part function which “strips away” the in-
finitesimal part, and outputs the standard real in the cluster of the
hyperreal uH (see Section 11, item 11.4). What may be bothering
the students is this unacknowledged application of the standard part
function, resulting in a loss of an infinitesimal.
We have, in fact, been looking at the problem “from above”, in
the context of non-standard analysis. Perhaps a helpful parallel is
provided by the famous animated film Flatland (cf. [1]), where the two–
dimensional creatures are unable to conceive of what we think of as the
sphere in 3-space, due to their dimension limitation. Similarly, one can
conceive of the difficulty in the understanding of the unital evaluation
of .999 . . ., as due to the limitation of the standard real vision.
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The notion of an infinitesimal appeals to intuition (see R. Courant’s
comment in Section 12) and would not go away inspite of what is, by
now, over a century of (ǫ, δ)-ideology (see E. Bishop’s comment in Sec-
tion 12). Highschool students are exposed to the thorny .999 . . . issue
before they are exposed to any rigorous notion of a real number. They
are not aware of fine differences between rational numbers, algebraic
numbers, real numbers, hyperreal numbers. A related point is make by
Keisler in his textbook [15], when he points out that “we have no way
of knowing what the line in physical space looks like”. Most students
(perhaps all) initially believe that the mysterious number with “infin-
itely many” repeated digits 9 falls short of the value 1. If an education
professional claims that the students are making a mistake, might he
in fact be making a pedagogical error?
11. A non-standard glossary
In this section we present some illustrative terms and facts from non-
standard calculus [15]. The relation of being infinitely close is denoted
by the symbol ≈. Thus, x ≈ y if and only if x− y is infinitesimal.
11.1. Natural hyperreal extension f ∗. The extension principle of
non-standard calculus states that every real function f has a hyperreal
extension, denoted f ∗ and called the natural extension of f . The trans-
fer principle of non-standard calculus asserts that every real statement
true for f , is true also for f ∗. For example, if f(x) > 0 for every
real x in its domain I, then f ∗(x) > 0 for every hyperreal x in its do-
main I∗. Note that if the interval I is unbounded, then I∗ necessarily
contains infinite hyperreals. We will typically drop the star ∗ so as not
to overburden the notation.
11.2. Internal set. Internal set is the key tool in formulating the
transfer principle, which concerns the logical relation between the prop-
erties of the real numbers R, and the properties of a larger field denoted
R
∗
called the hyperreal line. The field R∗ includes, in particular, infinites-
imal (“infinitely small”) numbers, providing a rigorous mathematical
realisation of a project initiated by Leibniz. Roughly speaking, the
idea is to express analysis over R in a suitable language of mathemat-
ical logic, and then point out that this language applies equally well
to R∗. This turns out to be possible because at the set-theoretic level,
the propositions in such a language are interpreted to apply only to
internal sets rather than to all sets. Note that the term “language”
is used in a loose sense in the above. A more precise term is theory
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in first-order logic. Internal sets include natural extension of standard
sets.
11.3. Standard part function. The standard part function “st” is
the key ingredient in Abraham Robinson’s resolution of the paradox of
Leibniz’s definition of the derivative as the ratio of two infinitesimals
dy
dx
.
The standard part function associates to a finite hyperreal number x,
the standard real x0 infinitely close to it, so that we can write
st(x) = x0.
In other words, “st” strips away the infinitesimal part to produce the
standard real in the cluster. The standard part function “st” is not
defined by an internal set (see item 11.2 above) in Robinson’s theory.
11.4. Cluster. Each standard real is accompanied by a cluster of hy-
perreals infinitely close to it. The standard part function collapses the
entire cluster back to the standard real contained in it. The cluster
of the real number 0 consists precisely of all the infinitesimals. Every
infinite hyperreal decomposes as a triple sum
H + r + ǫ,
where H is a hyperinteger, r is a real number in [0, 1), and ǫ is in-
finitesimal. Varying ǫ over all infinitesimals, one obtains the cluster
of H + r.
11.5. Derivative. To define the real derivative of a real function f in
this approach, one no longer needs an infinite limiting process as in
standard calculus. Instead, one sets
f ′(x) = st
(
f(x+ ǫ)− f(x)
ǫ
)
, (11.1)
where ǫ is infinitesimal, yielding the standard real number in the cluster
of the hyperreal argument of “st” (the derivative exists if and only
if the value (11.1) is independent of the choice of the infinitesimal).
The addition of “st” to the formula resolves the centuries-old paradox
famously criticized by George Berkeley [3] (in terms of the Ghosts of
departed quantities, cf. [21, Chapter 6]), and provides a rigorous basis
for the calculus.
11.6. Continuity. A function f is continuous at x if the following
condition is satisfied: y ≈ x implies f(y) ≈ f(x).
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11.7. Uniform continuity. A function f is uniformly continuous on I
if the following condition is satisfied:
• standard: for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for
all x ∈ I and for all y ∈ I, if |x− y| < δ then |f(x)− f(y)| < ǫ.
• non-standard: for all x ∈ I∗, if x ≈ y then f(x) ≈ f(y).
See Remark 5.1 for a more detailed discussion.
11.8. Hyperinteger. A hyperreal number H equal to its own integer
part
H = [H ]
is called a hyperinteger (here the integer part function is the natural
extension of the real one). The elements of the complement Z∗ \ Z are
called infinite hyperintegers.
11.9. Proof of extreme value theorem. Let H be an infinite hy-
perinteger. The interval [0, 1] has a natural hyperreal extension. Con-
sider its partition into H subintervals of equal length 1
H
, with partition
points xi = i/H as i runs from 0 to H . Note that in the standard
setting, with n in place of H , a point with the maximal value of f
can always be chosen among the n + 1 partition points xi, by induc-
tion. Hence, by the transfer principle, there is a hyperinteger i0 such
that 0 ≤ i0 ≤ H and
f(xi0) ≥ f(xi) ∀i = 0, ..., H. (11.2)
Consider the real point
c = st(xi0).
An arbitrary real point x lies in a suitable sub-interval of the partition,
namely x ∈ [xi−1, xi], so that st(xi) = x. Applying “st” to the inequal-
ity (11.2), we obtain by continuity of f that f(c) ≥ f(x), for all real x,
proving c to be a maximum of f (see [15, p. 164]).
11.10. Limit. We have limx→a f(x) = L if and only if whenever the
difference x− a is infinitesimal, the difference f(x)−L is infinitesimal,
as well, or in formulas: if st(x) = a then st(f(x)) = L.
Given a sequence of real numbers {xn|n ∈ N}, if L ∈ R we say L
is the limit of the sequence and write L = limn→∞ xn if the following
condition is satisfied:
st(xH) = L for all infinite H (11.3)
(here the extension principle is used to define xn for every infinite value
of the index). This definition has no quantifier alternations. The stan-
dard (ǫ, δ)-definition of limit, on the other hand, does have quantifier
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alternations:
L = lim
n→∞
xn ⇐⇒ ∀ǫ > 0 , ∃N ∈ N , ∀n ∈ N : n > N =⇒ d(xn, L) < ǫ.
(11.4)
11.11. Non-terminating decimals. Given a real decimal
u = .d1d2d3 . . . ,
consider the sequence u1 = .d1, u2 = .d1d2, u3 = .d1d2d3, etc. Then
by definition,
u = lim
n→∞
un = st(uH)
for every infinite H . Now if u is a non-terminating decimal, then one
obtains a strict inequality uH < u by transfer from un < u. In partic-
ular,
.999 . . . ; . . . 9ˆ = .999 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
= 1− 1
10H
< 1, (11.5)
where the hat ˆ indicates the H-th Lightstone decimal place. The
standard interpretation of the symbol .999 . . . as 1 is necessitated by
notational uniformity: the symbol .a1a2a3 . . . in every case corresponds
to the limit of the sequence of terminating decimals .a1 . . . an. Alter-
natively, the ellipsis in .999 . . . could be interpreted as alluding to an
infinity of nonzero digits specified by a choice of an infinite hyperinte-
ger H ∈ N∗ \N. The resulting H-infinite extended decimal string of 9s
corresponds to an infinitesimally diminished hyperreal value (11.5).
Such an interpretation is perhaps more in line with the naive initial
intuition persistently reported by teachers.
12. Courant, Lakatos, and Bishop
Prior to Robinson, mathematicians thought of infinitesimals in terms
of “naive befogging” and “vague mystical ideas”. Thus, Richard Courant
[8, p. 81] wrote as follows:
We must, however, guard ourselves against thinking of dx
as an “infinitely small quantity” or “infinitesimal”, or
of the integral as the “sum of an infinite number of in-
finitesimally small quantities”. Such a conception would
be devoid of any clear meaning; it is only a naive befog-
ging of what we have previously carried out with preci-
sion.
and again on page 101:
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We have no right to suppose that first ∆x goes through
something like a limiting process and reaches a value
which is infinitesimally small but still not 0, so that ∆x
and ∆y are replaced by “infinitely small quantities” or
“infinitesimals” dx and dy, and that the quotient of
these quantities is then formed. Such a conception of
the derivative is incompatible with the clarity of ideas
demanded in mathematics; in fact, it is entirely mean-
ingless. For a great many simple-minded people it un-
doubtedly has a certain charm, the charm of mystery
which is always associated with the word “infinite”; and
in the early days of the differential calculus even Leib-
nitz [sic] himself was capable of combining these vague
mystical ideas with a thoroughly clear understanding of
the limiting process. It is true that this fog which hung
round the foundations of the new science did not pre-
vent Leibnitz [sic] or his great successors from finding
the right path. But this does not release us from the
duty of avoiding every such hazy idea [emphasis
added–MK] in our building-up of the differential and
integral calculus.
Needless to say, Courant’s criticism was not without merit at the time of
its writing (a quarter century prior to Robinson’s discovery). I. Lakatos
[16, p. 44] wrote in ’66 as follows:
Robinson’s work... offers a rational reconstruction of
the discredited infinitesimal theory which satisfies mod-
ern requirements of rigour and which is no weaker than
Weierstrass’s theory. This reconstruction makes infini-
tesimal theory an almost respectable ancestor of a fully
fledged, powerful modern theory, lifts it from the sta-
tus of pre-scientific gibberish, and renews interest in its
partly forgotten, partly falsified history.
Not everyone was persuaded. A decade later, Courant’s duty of avoid-
ing every such hazy idea was taken up under a constructivist banner
by E. Bishop. In his essay [5] cast in the form of an imaginary dia-
log between Brouwer and Hilbert, E. Bishop anchors his foundational
stance in a species of mathematical constructivism. Thus, Bishop’s op-
position to Robinson’s infinitesimals, expressed in a bristling review [6]
of Keisler’s textbook [15], was to be expected (and in fact was antici-
pated by editor Halmos). In a memorable parenthetical remark, Bishop
writes [6]:
A STRICT NON-STANDARD INEQUALITY .999 . . . < 1 17
Although it seems to be futile, I always tell my calculus
students that mathematics is not esoteric: It is common
sense. (Even the notorious (ǫ, δ)-definition of limit is
common sense [emphasis added–MK], and moreover
it is central to the important practical problems of ap-
proximation and estimation.)
Bishop is referring, of course, to the type of common-sense definition
reproduced in (11.4), which he favors over Keisler’s definition (11.3) in
terms of Robinson’s hyperreals.
Bishop expressed his views about non-standard analysis and its use
in teaching in a brief paragraph toward the end of his essay “Crisis in
contemporary mathematics” [5, p. 513-514]. After discussing Hilbert’s
formalist program he writes:
A more recent attempt at mathematics by formal finesse
is non-standard analysis. I gather that it has met with
some degree of success, whether at the expense of giv-
ing significantly less meaningful proofs I do not know.
My interest in non-standard analysis is that attempts
are being made to introduce it into calculus courses. It
is difficult to believe that debasement of meaning
[emphasis added–MK] could be carried so far.
Bishop’s view of the introduction of non-standard analysis in the class-
room as no less than a “debasement of meaning”, was duly noted by
J. Dauben [9].
To illlustrate how Bishop anchors his foundational stance in a species
of mathematical constructivism, note that in [5, pp. 507-508], he writes:
To my mind, it is a major defect of our profession that
we refuse to distinguish [...] between integers that are
computable and those that are not [...] the distinction
between computable and non-computable, or construc-
tive and non-constructive is the source of the most fa-
mous disputes in the philosophy of mathematics...
On page 511, Bishop defines a principle (LPO) as the statement that
it is possible to search “a sequence of integers to see
whether they all vanish”,
and goes on to characterize the dependence on the LPO as a procedure
both Brouwer and Bishop himself reject. S. Feferman [10] explains the
principle as follows:
Bishop criticized both non-constructive classical math-
ematics and intuitionism. He called non-constructive
18 KARIN USADI KATZ AND M. KATZ
mathematics “a scandal”, particularly because of its
“deficiency in numerical meaning”. What he simply
meant was that if you say something exists you ought to
be able to produce it, and if you say there is a function
which does something on the natural numbers then you
ought to be able to produce a machine which calculates
it out at each number.
The constructivist objections to LPO are similar to objections to the
law of excluded middle, and to proofs by contradiction (for example,
the traditional argument for the irrationality of
√
2 is a proof by con-
tradiction, but using classical continued fraction estimates, it is easy
to rewrite it in a numerically meaningful fashion, acceptable from the
constructivist viewpoint).
Given that a typical construction of Robinson’s infinitesimals (see
Keisler [15, p. 911]) certainly does rely on LPO, Bishop’s opposition
to such infinitesimals, expressed in a bristling review [6] of Keisler’s
textbook, was to be expected.
Non-standard calculus in the classroom was analyzed in the Chicago
study by K. Sullivan [22]. Sullivan showed that students following the
non-standard calculus course were better able to interpret the sense of
the mathematical formalism of calculus than a control group following
a standard syllabus. Such a conclusion was also noted by M. Artigue [2,
p. 172].
13. A 10-step proposal
In the matter of teaching decimal notation, we would like to obtain
some reaction from educators to the following proposal concerning the
problem of the unital evaluation of .999 . . .. A student may ask:
What does the teacher mean to happen exactly after
nine, nine, nine when he writes dot, dot, dot?
How is a teacher to handle such a question? Experience shows that
toeing the standard line on the unital evaluation of .999 . . . possesses
a high-frustration factor in the classroom. Rather than baffling the
student with such a categorical claim, a teacher could proceed by pre-
senting the following ten points, based on the material outlined in
Section 11:
(1) the reals are not, as the rationals are not, the maximal number
system;
(2) there exist larger number systems, containing infinitesimals;
(3) in such larger systems, the interval [0, 1] contains many numbers
infinitely close to 1;
A STRICT NON-STANDARD INEQUALITY .999 . . . < 1 19
(4) in a particular larger system called the hyperreal numbers, there
is a generalized notion of decimal expansion for such numbers,
starting in each case with an unbounded number of digits “9”;
(5) all such numbers therefore have an arguable claim to the no-
tation “.999 . . .” which is patently ambiguous (the meaning of
the ellipsis “. . .” requires disambiguation);
(6) all but one of them are strictly smaller than 1;
(7) the convention adopted by most professional mathematicians
is to interpret the symbol “.999 . . .” as referring to the largest
such number, namely 1 itself;
(8) thus, the students’ intuition that .999 . . . falls just short of 1
can be justified in a mathematically rigorous fashion;
(9) the said extended number system is mostly relevant in infinites-
imal calculus (also known as differential and integral calculus);
(10) if you would like to learn more about the hyperreals, go to your
teacher so he can give you further references.
14. Epilogue
A goal of our, admittedly non-standard, analysis is both to edu-
cate and to heal. The latter part involves placing balm upon the be-
wilderment of myriad students of decimal notation, frustrated by the
reluctance of their education professionals to yield as much as an infini-
tesimal iota in their evaluation of the symbol .999..., or to acknowledge
the ambiguity of an ellipsis.
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